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TRANSPORTATION PLANNING AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
ROSS D. NETHERTON*
When Congress approved the Department of Transportation Act in
1966, it enunciated and gave the force of law to a new national policy
that "special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of
the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and
waterfowl refuges, and historic sites."' The provisions for implemen-
tation of this policy were set forth in Sec. 4 (f) of the act, as follows:
"The Secretary shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries
of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agricul-
ture, and with the States in developing transportation plans and
programs that include measures to maintain or enhance the
natural beauty of the lands traversed. After the effective date of
this Act, the Secretary shall not approve any program or project
which requires the use of any land from a public park, recreation
area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site unless (1)
there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such
land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to such park recreational area, wildlife and water-
fowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use."
This legislation was, in one sense, a response to the statement in the
President's Message calling for establishment of the Department of
Transportation, in which were listed certain shortcomings of the
Nation's transportation system, and specifically said that "[I]t is not
good enough when it lays out new freeways to serve cities and
suburbs-and carelessly scars the irreplaceable countryside."'2 In a larger
sense, however, Congress was addressing a problem which lies much
*B.A., M.A., J.D., University of Chicago; LL.M., University of Michigan;
S.J.D., University of Wisconsin. Admitted to bar, State of Illinois, U.S. Supreme
Court.
1. PuB. L. No. 89-670 (October 15, 1966).
2. H.R. Doc. 399, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., March 2, 1966.
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deeper in the nation's system for the management of resources through
the investment of public funds. This problem involves the task of
determining priorities in managing the nation's growth, including the
specific problem of reconciling competing public uses of land and
other resources. By "managing the nation's growth," I mean conserv-
ing as well as exploiting, maintaining as well as changing the face of
the land, with applications to the man-made environment of urban
areas as well as the natural environment of all types. It was, there-
fore-and still is-a problem which touches both the basic needs of
the public and the basic powers of government. The policy set forth
in the Department of Transportation Act was not the first expression
of Federal concern for the values of recreation land, environmental
quality and the country's cultural history. One month before the De-
partment of Transportation Act, the President had signed the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1966, which declared that in carrying out the
highway program there should be a "maximum effort to preserve
Federal, State, and local government parklands and historic sites, and
the beauties and historic values of such lands and sites."' Implement-
ing this policy, the act provided that after July 1, 1968, approval of
highway projects using such lands would be predicated on a showing
that the project was based on "all possible planning, including con-
siderations of alternatives to the use of such land, to minimize any
harm to such park or site resulting from such use."4 This feature of
the 1966 Federal-Aid Highway Act was largely the work of Senator
Jackson of Washington, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Inte-
rior and Insular Affairs, and Senator Yarborough of Texas.
THE TROUBLE WiTH HIGHWAYS
The problem which these Senators sought to deal with was stated
by Senator Yarborough in proposing to amend the 1966 Highway Act.
He said:
State and Federal Governments have on the whole performed
superbly in building the highway system .... Yet in recent years,
it must be recognized, there has been some sharp discontent-not
with the highway system as a whole, but with a series of specific
cases in which the highway threatens to become a destroyer rather
than a creator, to rob assets rather than add them, to blight rather
than build ....
3. PuB. L. No. 89-574 (Sept. 13, 1966).
4. Ibid.
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Up to now the highway system has moved well in the open
country-side where more elbow room, less costly land rights-of-way
and lower density of population have given the highway planner
the opportunity to lay out modern highways with least hurt to
other interests and maximum gain to all .... What has happened
is that the highway planners and engineers have tried to apply
what can be well, effectively and most easily done in the open
countryside, to the more heavily built-up and populated areas ....
It is ironic that at the same time the Congress has encouraged and
provided funds for the acquisition and development of parks and
other open spaces, it has permitted the highway program to take
away just such spaces. It hardly seems consistent to pay Paul
while robbing Peter.5
The Senator went on to suggest that the trouble was that there was
no guiding policy for planning the highway program in such a way as
to save the other assets of the environment. To this end, he offered an
amendment to the highway act which stated such a policy and pro-
vided that after July 1, 1968, approval of highway projects which
required land being used for federal, state or local parks or historic
sites would be conditioned on "no feasible alternative to the use of
such land," on the project including "all possible planning to mini-
mize any harm to the park or site resulting from such use," and,
"where possible and appropriate," providing substitute land for the
park or site.
Senator Yarborough returned to this topic several more times in
the days that followed, building the case for his amendment with
examples of what he cited as the highway program's disregard for
environmental and cultural values. Destruction of an 1840 seawall in
St. Augustine, a proposed six-lane expressway along the Mississippi
in front of New Orleans' French Quarter, Los Angeles' Elysian Park
and San Antonio's Brackenridge Park, 150 historic buildings in Phila-
delphia, the Embarcadero Freeway and San Francisco's waterfront-all
these and more were marched through the record to demonstrate the
observation that "[In] an undeveloped area perhaps any road can be a
good road, but in an overdeveloped area any road can be a bad
road."8
The considered judgments of some of the nation's most articulate
observers of the urban scene were also cited. Analyzing New Orleans'
5. 112 CONG. REc. 14,073 (1966).
6. 112 CONG. REc. 17,632 (1966), quoting from The Headless Horseman Rides
Again, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 128 (July-August, 1965).
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plight, Wolf Von Eckhardt pointed up an important facet of the total
problem when he noted that:
As elsewhere, study after highway department-sponsored study
'proved' the infallability of the highway department's decision.
As elsewhere, the city planners failed to do any planning and
therefore could not propose any alternatives. 7
Lawrence Halprin saw the problem this way:
The problem in handsome freeway design has been thought to
be primarily one of the design of structures, but this has been
overemphasized. Most freeways, no matter how beautifully struc-
tured, cannot overcome the enormous damage and destruction
which these vast and complex arteries cause in the heart of a city
by their very presence and, more importantly, by the fact of their
dumping cars into the downtown core. The real problem is how
to integrate freeways into the fabric of the city without destroying
important civic values. It is the fragmentation of outlook, the
inadequate attention to integrated overall environmental plan-
ning, rather than the architectural design of the structures, that
has resulted in serious errors....
The design of urban freeways, on the whole, must follow a design
approach which is diametrically opposite to rules laid down for
scenic highways in the country . . . . If these [scenic highway]
criteria are applied in the heart of cities, they result in havoc.
The long, sinuous curve destroys innumerable houses, the wide
right-of-way creates barriers of incredible width between neigh-
borhoods, and the continuous curves are completely unsympa-
thetic and visually destructive to the predominant linear qualities
of the cities. The scenic highway in the city is antiurban and
destructive of urban values. Urban freeways must be designed as
part of the urban environment, with narrower rights-of-way,
linear qualities, and multiple levels; ... 8
He went on to suggest in detail how freeways could become integral
parts of the cityscape utilizing design which blended them into the
man-made design of urban areas and recognized that the entire func-
tion of transportation inside cities differed from that of transportation
outside these areas.
RuRAL PARKLANDS AND WILDLIFE AREAs
While the case for the Yarborough amendment was thus being built
on alleged failure of the highway program to provide the right kinds
7. 112 Co G. REc. 14,386 (1966).
8. 112 CONG. Rnc. 17,632-33 (1966), quoting from L. HALPRIN, CITIES,
(1964).
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of highways for cities, the problems of highway route location in rural
areas were also coming under increasingly critical scrutiny. As
in the case of the city, the countryside had its share of illustrative
situations which dramatized the problems of building highways with-
out destroying environmental values-the court battle over attempts
to build a four-lane highway through Prairie Creek Redwoods State
Park in California, the negotiations between the Bureau of Public
Roads and the Forest Service over protection of the trout stream in
Utah's Logan Canyon in connection with reconstruction of the high-
way along the canyon floor, the public demonstrations against the
East Hudson Parkway Authority's construction crews cutting down
trees for parkway improvement in Westchester County (leading to the
arrest of 16 persons who linked arms in front of the bulldozers), and
proposals to build roads through the Everglades, the University of
Oklahoma's wildlife refuge, the western shore of Lake Tahoe, and the
Wheeler National Wildlife Refuge in northern Alabama.9
There do not appear to be any statistics on exactly how much
recreation land, wildlife and scenic areas, and reserved open space
have been taken for highways since the accelerated road construction
program began in 1956. Estimates that nationwide one million acres
are passing from rural to urban status each year indicate something
about the overall magnitude of the process involved, but not the
amount of land highways consume.' 0 Such data would have to be
compiled from land-using agencies of the Federal, State and local
government, and various special instrumentalities of government. To
date, it apparently has not been undertaken.
Another facet of the criticism of highways focused on the destructive
effects which were alleged to result from the way they are designed in
relation to streams and other bodies of water. These effects arise from
cut and fill operations which straighten meandering watercourses, alter
the drainage pattern of stream basins, and often lead to erosion. The
harm which these effects may have on fish and wildlife is well docu-
mented;" but, again, the data is regional and selective. Thus, the
assertion that in the Pacific Northwest more than 50 prime trout
9. 112 CONG. Rrc. 17,640-44 (1966).
10. U.S. DEPARTMFNT OF AoICuLTURI-, Major Uses of Land and Water in
the United States, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT No. 8, (Washington G.P.O.,
1962), 9.
11. 112 CoNG. REc. 19,476 (1966).
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streams have been ruined by poor highway design,12 is merely sug-
gestive, as is the report that:
"A survey of 24 Montana streams showed 78.4 miles of stream
had been lost to highway and railroad construction. The national
loss from straightening meanders must be in the thousands of
miles.""3
In 1964, hearings on this problem were held before the Senate Com-
mittee on Public Works. As a result, the Bureau of Public Roads
issued a policy directive requiring consultation between highway de-
partments and State wildlife agencies whenever federally-owned lands
were being crossed by a highway project.' 4 However, this has not been
the case with the effects of highway construction with other aspects
of ecology, which have little documentation.r
THE COMMON LAW AND STATUTE BACKGROUND
Still another facet of the background of the Yarborough amend-
ment involved the provisions of the common law and State legisla-
tion for reconciling the competing interests of environmental values
and transportation. Proponents of the amendment claimed the state
of the law heavily favored the highway?6
The question of whether a public agency could, through eminent
domain, take land already devoted to public use was not a new one.
It had arisen by the 1840's when the outburst of demand for railroad
right-of-way brought eminent domain into prominent (and sometimes
promiscuous) use. Illustrative of these times is the case of Inhabitants
of Springfield vs. Connecticut River RR,'1 in which the Massachusetts
Supreme Court found it necessary to enjoin the railroad from laying
its tracks down the middle of a public road, unless, upon remanding
the case, it was found to be really necessary.
In these days of free-for-all railroading, things got considerably
worse before they got better-if one is to believe the court cases. There
12. DOUGLAS, The Public Be Damned, 16 PLAYBoY 143, 182 (July 1969).
13. 112 CONG. REc. 19,477 (1966).
14. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PUBLIC ROADS, COORDINATION OF PUBLIC
INTERESTS OF HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENTS WITH THoSE OF FISH AND WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, INSTRUCTIONAL MEMORANDUm 21-5-63, June 12, 1963.
15. CONG. REc. supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., FORER, Preservation of America's Park Lands: The Inadequacy
of Present Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1093 (1966), Tipy, Roads and Recreation,
55 Ky. L. J. 799 (1967).
17. 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 63 (1849).
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are numerous records of such disputes, including instances where rail-
roads were stopped from going through public parks,'8 and even one
California decision in 1863 which had to stop one railroad from
condemning the right-of-way of another railroad. 9
From these cases came the doctrine of prior public use, which
held, in substance, that where prior public use exists, only an unam-
biguous and positive act of the sovereign can sustain the taking of
such land through eminent domain. Over the years, this doctrine has
developed refinements. One such refinement holds that prior public
use is protected only if the land is publicly owned or subject to an
obligation of public service imposed by the sovereign state. Another
is that no prior public use is protected against condemnation by the
United States, 20 and that the sovereign States and their agencies may
condemn land owned and publicly dedicated by non-sovereign units
of government.2' These refinements indicate that the doctrine of prior
public use is not a constitutional limitation on the inherent sovereign
power of eminent domain, but rather a doctrine controlling the inter-
pretation of the uses of that power-specifically, the legal effect of acts
by the sovereign or its delegate at two different points in time.22 Or,
to put the question differently, when does the law recognize that the
sovereign has changed its mind concerning the substitution of one
public use for another on the land?
Whatever the state of the common law might be, proponents of the
Yarborough amendment argued that in numerous instances State legis-
lation often weighted the law in favor of highway use of the land.
Citing the California and New York statutes as instances in which the
highway departments' authority for use of eminent domain was
worded to give a clear preference in favor of roads over parks,2 3 they
argued that if this was in fact the State law it was unfair and unwise.
In other instances, such as the ruling of the Texas court in the
18. In re Boston & Albany R.R., 53 N.Y. 574 (1873).
19. Contra Costa Coal Mines R.R. v. Moss, 23 Cal. 324 (1863).
20. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
21. State Highway Comm'n v. City of Elizabeth, 102 N.J. Eq. 221, 140 A.
335 (Nj. Ch. 1928), aff'd mem., 103 N.J. Eq. 376, 143 A. 916 (N.J. Ct. Err. &
App. 1928); 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.2 at 203 & n. 51 (3d ed. 1950).
22. State Highway Comm'r v. Union County Park Comm'n 89 N.J. Super.
202, 214 A.2d 446 (Super. Ct. L. Div. 1965), appeal dismissed as moot, 48 N.J.
246, 225 A.2d 122 (1966). See also 68 COLUMI. L. Rav. 155, 157 & n. 16 (1968).
23. CAL. STS. & H'wAYs CODE § 103.5 (West 1956); N.Y. H'WAY § 10(28)
(McKinney 1962); N.Y. PUB. LANDS § 3(4) (McKinney 1951).
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controversy over San Antonio's Brackenridge Park, they argued that
courts had improperly expanded the meaning of State statutes which
merely gave the highway department a general authority to condemn
for right-of-way acquisition.24
Also cited as unfairly weighting the balance of power in favor of the
highway program was Sec. 108 of the Federal highway law, authorizing
Federal condemnation where the State could not do so, and the in-
stances where this procedure had been used to acquire right-of-way
through land reserved by State law to other public or quasi-public
services.25
Admittedly, the state of the law was not minutely scrutinized in the
debates on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966. If it had been, there
might have been some discussion of the signs for hope that the courts
themselves will work their way out of the dilemma of the prior public
use problem. It obviously is not in the interest of an orderly system
of laws to encourage easy displacement of one public use by another,
or to allow a merry-go-round of litigation to get started among several
contending agencies of a State which all have condemnation powers.
The decisions in Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation vs. Wild.
life Preserves, Inc. 26 and Board of Education vs. Pace College,27 in
1965 and 1966 respectively, suggest that there still remains some room
for flexible handling of the claims of competing public uses without
putting the court into the unenviable position of weighing communal
benefits from present or proposed public uses and judging such cases
as they interpret community needs.
Be this as it may, the current state of both common law and statute
law was presented as offering little protection to the environmental
values of the community, and the case for the Yarborough amend-
ment was thus strengthened.
EXTENSION OF THE NATIONAL POLICY
The issues raised by Senator Yarborough and proponents of his
amendment were not answered or rebutted either in the hearings or
debates. In its report, the Senate Committee on Public Works noted
24. 23 U.S.C. § 108 (1966).
25. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 209 F. Supp. 483 (S. D. Ill.
1962) Aff'd sub. nom. United States v. Pleasure Driveway, and Park Dist., 314
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
26. 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1965), aff'd 230 A.2d 505 (1967).
27. 27 App. Div. 2d 87, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1966).
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that it had considered two matters beyond the original proposal: one
was the protection of wildlife refuge areas, which it recommended; the
other was the addition of a provision authorizing as part of right-of-
way cost the acquisition of substitute land as "reimbursement" for
parkland taking, which it did not recommend because of the inde-
terminate cost involved.28 However, neither of these features was
adopted by the Senate.
In the Senate-House Conference Committee, the amendment was
agreed to, with deletion of the requirement that there be no feasible
alternative to use of the land for highway purposes, and addition of
the requirement that planning must include consideration of alterna-
tives to use of the land for highway purposes.29
This new provision of the 1966 highway law presented its adminis-
trators with three problems: (1) the need for clear definitions of the
parklands and historic sites covered by the act; (2) the need for pro-
cedures to assure that the spirit of the law was honored in case ad-
ministrative decisions were disputed; and (3) the need for a mecha-
nism of liaison and coordination between the Federal agencies in-
volved-the Bureau of Public Roads, and various agencies in the De-
partments of Agriculture, the Interior, and Housing and Urban
Development.
Before these questions could be fully explored, however, the Con-
gressional policy and mandate were altered by passage of the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act.30 With this act, the national policy was
extended to include wildlife and waterfowl refuges, the requirement
of no feasible or prudent alternative to use of the land for highways
28. S. REP. No. 1410, FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1966, 89th Cong., 2nd
Sen. 38, 45 (1966).
29. H. R. REP. No. 1903, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11, 12 (1966).
30. PuB. L. No. 89-670 (October 15, 1966).
As finally enacted, 23 U.S.C. 138 read as follows:
Preservation of Parklands.
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that in carrying out the pro-
visions of this title, the Secretary shall use maximum effort to preserve Federal,
State, and local government parldands and historic sites and the beauty and
historic value of such lands and sites. The Secretary shall cooperate with the
States in developing highway plans and programs which carry out such policy.
After July 1, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve under section 105 of this title
any program for a project which requires the use for such project of any land
from a Federal, State, or local government park or historic site unless such pro-
gram includes all possible planning, including consideration of alternative use of
such land, to minimize any harm to such park or site resulting from such use."
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became a condition of project approval, and all transportation projects
(rather than just highways) became subject to the policy and approval
procedure.31
The House of Representatives accepted Sec. 4 (f) cautiously, and,
in its debate on adoption of the conference report, warned that it
should not be "misinterpreted to mean that preservation of natural
and man-made resources would be the overriding consideration in
highway construction. It was made clear at the time that as desirable
as parkland preservation might be, other important factors must be
considered."32
In the conference, the term "prudent" was added to "feasible" for
the purpose of emphasizing that environmental considerations should
not exclude all others. On this, Rep. Kluczynski said:
To do so would result in as many inequities as justifying trans-
portation plans merely on the basis of economy or efficiency.
Other considerations would include the integrity of neighbor-
hoods, the displacement of people and businesses, the protection
of schools and churches, and the myriad of other social and
human values we find in our communities.
Attempting to define "feasible alternative" in light of all of these
considerations is virtually impossible, and may result in hamper-
ing and otherwise unnecessarily delaying transportation progress
S... I am glad to see the words 'and prudent' added to this sec-
tion by the conference committee. With .... 'prudent' as the
operable word, this section now becomes workable and effective
33
Equally pointed concern for the administration of Sec. 4 (f) was
shown in the Senate as Secretary Alan Boyd took office as the first
head of the new Department of Transportation. In hearings on his
confirmation, he answered a series of questions regarding his interpre-
tation of this law. As to coordination in planning, he noted that the
Bureau of Public Roads had asked the State highway departments to
develop procedures for obtaining comments on highway route plans
from other agencies responsible for parks, fish and game refuges and
historic sites. Where divergent views could not be reconciled in the
field, questions would be submitted to BPR headquarters for decision.
As to the meaning of the term "feasible and prudent alternative," he
31. Ibid. § 4(1).
32. 112 CONG. REc. 26651 (October 13, 1966).
33. Ibid.
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declared that "the proper implementation of the congressional intent
will depend upon deciding when to accept higher monetary or social
costs in order to preserve our natural, aesthetic and historic herit-
age." 34 As to whether transportation planners had the "burden of
proving the need to construct an alternate route" around parklands,
he felt this was a matter for mutual cooperation by all concerned. And
as to his plans for consulting with the Secretaries of the Interior, Agri-
culture and Housing and Urban Development, he read the law as
applying generally rather than to individual projects.
This colloquy was recalled by Senator Jackson in April 1967 in a
letter to former Secretary Boyd which noted the Senator's concern that
these views did not adequately reflect the purpose and intent of the
law.3 Senator Jackson noted that Sec. 4 (f) applied to all forms of
transportation projects, not merely highways, and required the Secre-
tary of Transportation to consult with the states and Secretaries of
Interior, Agriculture and Housing and Urban Development for several
purposes, including the determination of what constitutes a "feasible
and prudent alternative" and "all possible planning to minimize
harm." Moreover, this consultation requirement applied not only to
"plans and programs" but also to "any program or project." He
expressed the opinion that such consultation would be most helpful
to the Secretary of Transportation in deciding controversial cases,
which ultimately was his responsibility under the law, and urged that
a formalized review and appeal procedure be established at the Secre-
tarial level for such controversies.
In the year that followed, the new Department of Transportation
engaged in the necessary tasks of organizing itself and establishing its
working relations with Congress and the other Federal departments.
Day-to-day administration of the Federal-aid highway program con-
tinued much as it had. No new policy and procedure memoranda or
instructional memoranda were issued regarding Sec. 4 (f), for it was
the view of the Bureau of Public Roads that its existing directives to
the state highway departments and its own field offices already pro-
vided adequate means for assuring consideration of environmental
factors in planning and construction.
As visualized by the Bureau of Public Roads, its existing administra-
tive machinery would handle "Sec. 4 (f) cases," and implement the
34. Hearings on Nomination of Alan S. Boyd to be Secretary of Transportation
before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 54, 55 (1967).
35. Letter, Senator Henry M. Jackson to Hon. Alan Boyd, Secretary of Trans-
portation, April 20, 1967.
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national policy generally, in the following manner: Initial responsi-
bility for determining the involvement of parkland, wildlife refuges
and historic sites rested with the State highway departments. As their
planners and designers developed locations for highway corridors,
and, thereafter, plans for right-of-way lines and design specifications,
the state's engineers would contact other governmental agencies and
public or private organizations whose parks, refuges or historic sites
were encroached or affected. The interests of these parties would be
ascertained, and their positions compiled and considered by the State
in preparing its project proposal. Alternative routes, if any, suggested
by non-highway agencies would be included in the analysis.
Ideally all positions would be finalized before the State prepared its
recommendations for submission to the Bureau of Public Roads. Thus
supported, the recommendation of the State could be reviewed by
BPR Division and Region Engineers and Washington headquarters.
Relying on completed and coordinated work in the field, BPR's head-
quarters has no need for further consultation with the headquarters
offices of other Federal agencies in order to determine the conditions
of its approval of projects, even where the State highway department
had not been successful in resolving all controversial aspects of the
projects.3
The only statutory exception to this procedure for advising the
Secretary of Transportation on highway project approval applied
where historic sites were involved. Under PUB. L. 89-665, the so-called
Historic Preservation Act of 1966,37 the heads of Federal agencies
responsible for Federal or federally assisted programs must afford the
President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation an opportunity
to comment on projects which affect historic sites and landmarks listed
in the National Register. Since the establishment of this 17-member
council in 1967, these review activities have been confined to contro-
versial cases, but several of these have occurred, and the Council's
advice has been utilized to good effect.
Tm LAw IN ACTION
The logic of this administrative system seems eminently sound.
Experience since 1966, however, has indicated that in many instances
36. Summary based on interview with John Kessler, Office of Right of Way and
Location, U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, Washington, D.C., July 10, 1969.
37. PuB. L. No. 89-665 (October 15, 1966).
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the law in action does not conform to its theory. In practice it has
turned out that the positions of the contending parties are seldom final
when submitted to BPR by the state highway departments. More-
over, decisions by highway authorities, even by the Secretary of
Transportation, were not accepted as final by those who disagreed
with them. Throughout the entire process of administrative review,
issues not fully settled by the state highway departments have re-
mained negotiable, and parallel to this process there frequently has
been recourse to the political authorities, the courts, and the press for
attempted relief.
A number of causes may contribute to this condition. One, no
doubt, is a "never-say-die" spirit among people who are aroused over
what they regard as the unnecessary taking or damaging of land
having values which surpass its use for transportation purposes.
Another is the fact that interagency consultation on programs and
projects has never been encouraged by a formalized arrangement-a
point stressed by Senator Jackson. 38 Another is the fact that it has not
been clear whether Sec. 4 (f) applied to projects in progress when the
law was passed.39 And, most recently, it is not entirely dear what
effect the two-hearing procedure for route location and highway design
may have on the handling of environmental conservation issues which
may be involved.
Against this background, it is to the credit of the state highway
departments, the Bureau of Public Roads, and the various recreation
land-managing agencies that they have been able to reconcile the great
majority of their mutual problems in the field. Periodically, a log is
compiled by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, which shows active
transportation projects having impact on parks, refuges and historic
38. Supra, note 34.
39. During debate on acceptance of the Conference Report on the Department
of Transportation Act, Rep. Cramer noted that Sec. 4(f) became effective 90
days after appointment of a Secretary or whenever declared by the President,
whereas the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966 specified that "conforming highways
to the preservaton of parks should not be effective until July 1, 1968." In reply
to Rep. Cramer's query as to which law controlled, Rep. Holifield, floor manager
of the bill, and Rep. Hardy, replied as follows:
"Mr. HARDY: I think it would be correct to say, would it not, that it
was not our intention to accelerate this date that had been decided on past
the statutory law?"
"Mr. HOLIFIELD: That is certainly true that it was not our intention
to accelerate this date, and we were unaware that we were accelerating
the date in this language." 112 Cong. Rec. 26652 (October 13, 1966).
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sites. The log for June 1969 shows some 47 highway and 6 airport
projects in 25 states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands.
The status of these projects ranges from the stage of location selection
by the state, through submission to and approval by BPR, to projects
under construction. This compilation has no official status as a roster
of Sec. 4 (f) cases, for in some instances the projects listed do not come
within the scope of Sec. 4 (f) as currently amended. Also, it is limited
to those situations which have been formally called to the Bureau's
attention by public or private agencies. Their listing does not imply
any position by the Department of the Interior. However, the record
shows that consultation and negotiation over controversial aspects of
some projects continues after BPR approval of routes and designs,
sometimes even after construction is underway. It thus suggests the
complexity of the administrative task involved in giving full effect to
the national policy declared by Congress in Sec. 2 (b) (2) of the De-
partment of Transportation Act, and an underlying cause for re-
examination of Sec. 4 (f) in 1968.
THE FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1968
Hearings on the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 included the
following testimony by the American Association of State Highway
Officials:
At the risk of being charged as insensitive to recreation, conser-
vation and historical sites, we believe there is an overemphasis
and overenthusiasm in administering Sec. 4 () of the Transporta-
tion Act of 1966, to the point that needed highway improvements
are being delayed and complicated, and that section 4 (f) is being
used to reopen decisions previously made or slow down the pro-
gram.... We believe that the Congress wrote its intent regarding
the administration of section 4 (f) in the legislative history, but
now we feel that that intent should be spelled out in legislation.
We are conscious of an involvement by nonhighway oriented
attornies and policy planners in the Department of Transporta-
tion in writing minutia and details in instructional and proce-
dural memorandums pertaining to section 4 (1), and that much
of this detail definitely encroaches on the authority and responsi-
bility vested by the States in their highway commissions.4 -
In hearings before the Committee on Public Works of the House
of Representatives, the AASHO witnesses were questioned for details
40. Hearings on H. R. 17134 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the House
Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 271 (1968).
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of this matter. Projects involving a Potomac River bridge for Wash-
ington, parks in Memphis and San Antonio, a primitive area in
Colorado, and New Orleans' waterfront expressway were cited as
illustrating the situations causing trouble.41 It was implied that in
practice Section 4 (f) was being interpreted as a prohibition against
use of parks, refuges and historic sites rather than a mechanism for
facilitating consideration of all relevant interests and alternatives.42
In its report, the House Committee on Public Works stated what it
considered the basis for implementing the policy of both Sec. 138 of
the 1966 Highway Law and Sec. 4 (f) of the Department of Transporta-
tion Act, as follows:
Neither section 138 nor section 4 (f) stands alone as the beacon
lighting the way to wisdom in the administration of our resources.
Both are intended to broaden, not narrow, the perspective in
decision-making. Parklands and historic sites, as well as the other
kinds of areas listed in these sectons, have very real value; if that
were not so, neither section of law would exist. No rational per-
son would suggest, however, that that value is the only one to be
considered in a judgment as to the best public interest. In weigh-
ing alternatives for highway location, equal consideration must be
given to other factors-to whether people will be displaced; to
whether existing communities will be disrupted; to whether the
established demand for adequate transportation facilities for
people, goods, and services will be met; and to the preferences
of the people of the area involved. Preservation for use is sound
conservation philosophy, and it is in that perspective that both
section 138 and section 4 (f) should be administered.4
Having said this, the committee recommended striking out the
provision that the Secretary of Transportation's approval of projects
must be based on no feasible and prudent alternative, and all possible
planning to minimize harm, and substitution of the single require-
ment that a project include "all possible planning, including consider-
ation of alternatives to the use of such land, to minimize any harm
41. House Hearings on "Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968" supra note 40,
at 279-80.
42. Id., specifically the following colloquy:
"Mr. CRAMER... Is it your position that you feel that the comparative
costs and advantages and disadvantages should be considered rather than
this being administered as a prohibition, in effect?
Mr. JOHNSON: The States should take a look at every alternative loca-
tion. In this matter that we had down in San Antonio, where the local people
actually approved the location and ordered the bond issues to buy the right-
of-way, I do not think it should have been opened up again."
43. H. R. REP. No. 1584, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968).
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to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or
historic site resulting from such use."'44
One dissenting voice was recorded in the House ReportP4 but the
House as a whole adopted the committee recommendation. In the
Senate, however, the Committee on Public Works urged retention of
the basic structure of Sec. 4 (f), with minor modifications of the defi-
nition of "construction costs." 48 In the conference committee, a
compromise was reached on the basis of amending both Sec. 4 (f) of
the Department of Transportation Act and Sec. 138 of Title 23, US
Code, "Highways," to make them identical as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort
should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside,
and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl
refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall
cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior,
Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the
States in developing transportation plans and programs that in-
dude measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of
the lands traversed. After the effective date of the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any pro-
gram or project which requires the use of any publicly owned
land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and water-
fowl refuge of national, State, or local significance as determined
by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof,
or any land from an historic site of national, State or local
significance as so determined by such officials unless (1) there is
no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and(2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize
harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl
refuge, or historic site resulting from such use.47
The Conference Committee added the following explanation:
This amendment of both relevant sections of law is intended to
make it unmistakably dear that neither section constitutes a man-
datory prohibition against the use of the enumerated lands, but
rather is a discretionary authority which must be used with both
wisdom and reason. The Congress does not believe, for example,
that substantial numbers of people should be required to move
in order to preserve these lands, or that dearly enunciated local
preferences should be overruled on the basis of this authority."
44. Id. at 43.
45. Id. at 63-4.
46. S. REP. No. 1340, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1968).
47. H. R. RaP. No. 1799, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1968).
48. Id. at 32.
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In this form, and with this explanation, the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1968 was passed.49 Aside from emphasizing Congressional
intent the chief substantive change was the limitation of application
of Sec. 4 (f) and Sec. 138 to publicly owned lands.
AN INTERIM AsSESSMENT
This recounting of attempts to reconcile the Nation's needs for
transportation and its needs to preserve and enhance its natural and
cultural resources may suggest that an interim assessment of the law
must, on balance, be a pessimistic one. Despite the efforts that have
been made to clarify the national policy and mandate for administra-
tion, it is evident that much needs to be done before the "wisdom and
reason" called for by the Conference Committee in 1968 can be
expected to prevail sufficiently to anticipate and resolve the competi-
tion that exists for space in the cities and the countryside.
The process of establishing such a system of administration is,
moreover, likely to be a lengthy one. Experience, research, and a
willingness to experiment will have to be combined to produce criteria
for comparing and evaluating social, economic and political goals and
programs involving public investment. When transportation decisions
are fully considered, they involve engineering aspects, socio-economic
aspects, and environmental aspects. In the past, transportation plan-
ners, recreation and conservation planners, and urban planners all
have appeared to use different yardsticks in measuring their claims on
our land resources. It is time they all agreed on a coordinated ap-
proach to their common goals.
On the brighter side, the mere fact that Sec. 4 (f) is written into the
law favors the ultimate development of such a coordinated viewpoint.
It has had, and will have, the effect of compelling transportation and
conservation planners to give more attention to each other's work,
and of bringing about more contact between them. As time goes on,
it seems predictable that an increasing number of potential contro-
versies over transportation route location and design will be reconciled
in the field. Certainly this is to be hoped.
But there remains an urgent need to improve the administrative
machinery for authoritatively interpreting the policy Congress has
provided, and resolving controversies efficiently and acceptably when
they occur. Here the questions which were put to Secretary of
49. PuB. L. No. 90-495, (August 23, 1968).
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Transportation Boyd in hearings on his nomination remain as valid
today as they were in 1966.
Congress has said that the Secretary of Transportation shall consult
with the States and the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture and
Housing and Urban Development in developing transportation plans
and programs that include measures to maintain or enhance environ-
mental quality. Steps to permit establishment of formal arrangements
for such consultation have been taken by the Department of the
Interior through a delegation of authority therefor to the Bureau of
Outdoor Recreation. 0 Establishment of formal consultative machin-
ery could facilitate working out realistic and acceptable interpreta-
tions of several aspects of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968.
Specifically, the limitation of Sec. 4 (f) and Sec. 138 to "publicly
owned" land apparently precludes their application to protect numer-
ous valuable lands, such as Philmont Ranch, an outstanding primitive
area owned by the Boy Scouts, or the lands of The Nature Conserv-
ancy, which are privately acquired for future transfer to public owner-
ship. The National Grange, the 4-H Clubs and the Audubon Society
all have extensive areas open to public use, and present additional
cases dearly within the scope of the national policy expressed in Sec.
2 (b) (2) of the Department of Transportation Act but apparently
not within the scope of amended Sec. 4 (f) . Deepdene Park and the
Stone Mountain Expressway, near Atlanta, owned by a quasi-public
body but administered by a county agency, illustrate another type of
hard case.
While statutory responsibility for approval of transportation projects
rests ultimately with the Secretary of Transportation, it seems clear
that his position is made unnecessarily difficult if he must perform
the role of an arbitrator between contending governmental agencies
in an adversary atmosphere, and without the aid of an impartial
advisor. In this regard the advisory activity of the President's Council
on Historic Preservation relating to Federal or federally assisted pro-
grams deserves careful evaluation as an instrument of conciliation
which might be copied.
The mechanisms for consultation and coordination among Federal
agencies responsible for meeting transportation, environmental and
recreation needs must have their counterparts at State and local levels
of government. Public agencies at these levels feel most directly the
50. 32 Fed. Reg. 4030 (1967).
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pressure of public demand for facilities and programs serving the
recreational and cultural needs of an American society which has more
leisure time than ever before, and has the means to actively seek a
style of life which affords the amenities of an environment which is
both healthful and pleasant. The coincidence of recent demands for
participatory democracy in programing the improvement of urban
areas, the rise of advocacy planning, the loosening of historic judicial
restraints against questioning the technical bases of executive and
administrative decisions for implementing public policies suggests that
development of interagency and public-private consultation cannot be
delayed much longer.
The interest which lawyers have in the development of improved
machinery of administrative coordination in the handling of environ-
mental aspects of highway location and design is very clear and direct.
If controversies of this nature cannot be settled administratively, it
seems clear they will tend to be taken into the courts. The long
history of court decisions relating to the doctrine of prior public use
has already been referred to. To this form of recourse, must be added
to the varied list of cases arising out of projects such as those centered
in San Antonio's Brackenridge Park, New Orleans' French Quarter,
Minneapolis' Minnehaha Park, and the Hudson River Expressway.5'
A third form which this basic issue of competing demands for land
may take is suggested by the California eminent domain statute which
establishes a rebuttable presumption that the most necessary public
use for property appropriated for public use as a State, regional,
county or city park is such use, and declares that this presumption
affects the burden of proof.52 The statute also gives a public agency
owning parkland the right to initiate action for a declaratory judg-
ment on the best use of the land prior to initiation of highway route
location studies. For this purpose the statute compels advance notifi-
cation and consultation between the highway department and other
affected land-managing agencies of governmental bodies.
The form and operation of administrative law, statute law, and
51. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F. Supp. 804
(SD.N.Y. 1969); See also Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
52. CAL. CrV. PRo. CODE § 1241.7 (Deering Supp. 1969); CAL. STS. & H'WAYS
CODE § 210.1 (Deering Supp. 1969).
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judge-made law relating to highways and environmental factors thus
tend to be interrelated. When good law is made in any of these forms,
all forms benefit. Good law, in this instance, inevitably reflects good
planning, and acts as a stimulant for it. This is a subject in which
both lawyers and planners serving the functions of transportation and
recreation have a deep mutual interest, and in which the entire Nation
has an increasingly important stake for the future.
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